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ABSTRACT 
Fragmentation and the lack of appropriately coordinated government services are widely 
considered to be costly problems impeding effective and efficient government service 
provision. Moreover, there is a growing realization that many modern social issues have 
developed into meta-problems that cannot be resolved by the traditional single agency 
approach. Coordination of services through more cooperative and collaborative networks of 
relationships between government agencies has become a preferred strategy for many public 
administrators. In this way, actors from a range of sectors form and reform into action 
networks to respond to existing and emergent issues. Managing these networks in order to 
achieve appropriate policy outcomes is an important aspect of modern day governance and 
strategy development. This issue is particularly important for the central agencies of state 
since they have a responsibility for ensuring consistent and cohesive government policy and 
service delivery. This paper gives an account of a public sector initiative aimed at enhancing 
service provision through the formation and management of inter-departmental networks of 
coordinative and cooperative action. It concludes that although networks are a useful 
mechanism of social coordination, their inherent benefits may be jeopardized when network 
management  issues make them vulnerable to pressures from the centre.  
Keywords: Networks, government, public management
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history governments have oscillated between three main forms of social 
organisation – the market, the state, and the community - to maximize social cohesion and 
coordinate resources in order to achieve protection and progress for society.  The process of 
creating the conditions for this ordered rule and collective action is termed ‘governance’ 
(Stoker, 1998) and its various formations are underpinned by a set of ideological assumptions 
and principles that guide their operation and seek to establish optimal operating conditions. 
Under the state or bureaucratic model, coordination is achieved principally through the 
hierarchy and legal authority that regulates relations. By contrast, the market model relies on 
price signals and contractual relations to bring dispersed competitors – buyers and sellers – 
together. Finally, within the community, coordination arises out of the solidarity shared and 
interpersonal relationships established out of coming together to deal with mutual issues 
(Scott 1981; Thompson et al, 1991; Davis and Rhodes, 2000).  The perceived failure of any 
one model provides the rationale for the introduction of another (Colebatch and Lamour 1993; 
Tshuma 2000), although generally the market and the state modes have dominated with the 
third pillar, the community, traditionally providing a ‘safety net’ or ‘watchdog’ role (Ryan, 
1998:11).  
 
Over the past century this shifting between paradigms can be seen in the intitial intervention, 
albeit limited, of the state to counterbalance the ‘unchecked capitalism’ of the late 1800s. 
Overtime as governments took on more responsibilities for universal service delivery and 
became increasingly bureaucratic and rule bound they were challenged by a growing sense of 
individualism within society as well as perceived inefficiencies and rigidity of the state. Since 
the 1980s government service provision has been replaced increasingly by more flexible 
market based initiatives aimed at improving cost efficiency and effectiveness ratios 
(Considine and Lewis, 1999; Brown, Ryan and Parker, 2000).  The net effect of both sets of 
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policies as they replace or are grafted onto existing policies has been a public sector that is 
increasingly fragmented and confusing (Aucoin 1995; Peters and Savioe, 1996; Peters 1998; 
Rhodes 1998; Davis and Rhodes 2000) and a social sector that is divided and lacks cohesion 
(Bradshaw, 2000; Funnell 2001). From an Australian perspective, de Carvalho (1998:107) 
argued that neither the market nor bureaucratic modes of coordination ‘ … provided a lasting 
improvement in the social and economic welfare of nations. They created as many problems 
as they solved’. Indeed, for many, this complex mix of often competing policies has resulted 
in the social fabric of many countries becoming frayed at the edges.   
 
‘Mending the social fabric’ has become a high priority for many governments and 
increasingly, the ideals of the community – in which interpersonal networks act to bring 
together the fragmented infrastructure of the broader public sector - are being presented as 
a legitimate alternative or augment to the more traditional models of social coordination 
(Blair, 1999; Adams and Hess 2001; Rhodes 1996). Thus as Davis and Rhodes (2000:95) 
note,  ‘networks put these fragmented bits back together’.  
 
For government, while all departments necessarily have a role to play in the building of 
relationships within and across government, the task of coordinating cross-sector policies and 
programs into a coherent ‘whole-of-government’ position has generally fallen to their central 
agencies, treasury, prime minister and cabinet, and public service management - 
predominantly because of their position at the hub of decision-making around key areas such 
as policy, finance, administration and legislation (Painter, 1987; Head, 1996; Bridgman and 
Davis, 1998).  These agencies respectively have control over funding, policy processes and 
management of people and organizational structures, giving them substantial capacity to 
influence by exercise of direct authority as well as indirect influence (O’Grady, 1985). 
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In view of the growing calls for cross-sector coordination, seamless and more innovative 
service delivery modes, the central agencies of many governments, including the Queensland 
State Government, introduced a number of network based initiatives aimed at ‘joining-up’ 
and maximizing the service outcomes of a range of dispersed and disparate programs and 
projects. The Government Service Delivery Project (GSD) was one such attempt by a 
Queensland central agency to apply a network model of coordination of government services. 
The GSD project used as its basis the establishment of relationships to foster existing and 
emergent cross-department activities to achieve enhanced service outcomes. Despite the 
growing reliance on network forms to deal with multiplex social issues and a growing 
interdependence between agencies, there remains a limited understanding about how they 
actually operate and how networks can best be managed to maximize outcomes and ensure 
sustainability. Moreover, the role of government and, in particular central agencies, in these 
networks remains unclear (Milward and Provan, 2000). The issues relating to the effective 
management of networks and appropriate governance structures is explored in a case study of 
a networked model of 'whole-of-government' coordination, the GSD Project. This paper 
proceeds by identifying antecedents to the growth of network coordination, examines the 
benefits and costs of networks and analyses the emerging role of government in network 
management and governance. 
 
Convergent Issues and Increased Need for coordination 
During the 1980s and 1990s a number of issues converged which made the diverse and 
fragmented sector no longer tenable and network coordination an increasingly necessary 
objective. First among these was the financial limits placed on government and public 
services (Crawford, 1996; Bekker and Zouridis, 1999). Other factors include changing 
community expectations (Davis and Keating, 2000) and continuing advances in information 
and communication technology which are seen as a way of integrating the tasks of a range of 
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government providers in a more cost efficient and timely manner (Crawford, 1996; Bellamy 
and Taylor, 1998; Bekker and Zouridis, 1999).  
 
Most importantly, there was a growing realization that many modern social issues have 
developed into meta-problems that cannot be resolved by the traditional single agency or 'silo' 
approach (Waddock, 1991; Rhodes, 1998; Pearson, 1999; Mitchell and Shortell, 2000) or 
through the complexity of the market (de Carvahlo, 1998). These types of broad, complex 
problems defy precise definition, cut across policy and service areas and have no simple 
solutions (Chisholm, 1996; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998) and if left unattended, result in a 
high cost to the achievement of a civil society (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). 
 
Gradually, a broad consensus grew within the political, business and community arenas that 
multiple, non-compatible systems detracted from productivity, efficiency and effectiveness. 
As Aucoin (1995:245) commented on the Canadian situation: 
As the government responds to domestic pressures for quality public services, it 
will need to improve the integration of its service delivery systems. Individual 
citizens, client groups and businesses increasingly are demanding services that 
do not subject them to the inconveniences and costs of fragmented 
government. 
 
This fundamental concern with the inability of government agencies as they are currently 
structured and operated to deal with 'wicked' or intractable' social issues has been identified 
by government leaders including, among others, Clinton in the United States, Schroeder in 
Germany and was clearly articulated in the Blair Government's 'new deal' approach. This 
view holds thatthe’…biggest challenges facing Government do not easily fit into traditional 
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(government) structures.  They require a wide range of departments and agencies to work 
together’ (Performance Innovation Unit, 2000).  
 
As a result the focus of government in many jurisdictions, including Australia began to shift 
away from an emphasis on sustaining costly and increasingly ineffective proprietary systems 
exemplified in a single agency structure to establishing linkages within and across 
departments and the myriad of community agencies to realize public policy intentions 
(Rhodes, 1998; Mitchell and Shortell, 2000). Lowndes and Skelcher (1998:315) describe the 
shift from departmental ‘silos’ to shared arrangements: 
 
And so the apparently tidy hierarchy of the public bureaucracy is reshaped to establish 
lateral, diagonal and vertical relationships with other bodies operating at different tiers 
and in associated policy fields. 
 
Alliances and partnerships and other forms of cross-institutional and interorganizational 
relations are widely seen as an integrating strategy to coordinate organizational fragmentation 
and environmental complexity (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Mitchell and Shortell, 2000). 
Moreover, as Podger (1994) asserts, such mechanisms allow for more cooperative agendas to 
transpire between organizations as distinct from individualist approaches of more recent 
times. The variegated composition, ideologies and expectations of these interorganizational 
arrangements suggest a similar diversity in their form and structure.    
 
Networks: Coordinating Complexity and Attaining Collaborative Advantage 
While interorganizational arrangements take many forms (Mandell, 1999) ranging from 
partnerships to mergers (Gottfredson and White, 1981; Kanter, 1994; Limerick, Cunnington 
and Crowther, 1998; Mitchell and Shortell, 2000; Mol, 2001) they are often referred to 
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metaphorically as 'networked organizations' (Miles and Snow, 1986), and 'interfirm' or 
'organizational' networks' (Uzzi, 1996). However, as Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue, on 
their own such 'interfirm' arrangements or structures do not constitute a network. Rather, 
networks are formed out of the ongoing and relatively stable patterns of relations that are 
established between organizations or departments involved in an interorganizational 
arrangement. Since networks can be highly fluid constructs they are dependent on the ongoing 
social relations established between members to create the shared values, trust and mutuality 
necessary for collective action. This form of interfirm or interdepartmental coordination is 
referred to as 'network governance', and contrasts with the bureaucratic structures within firms 
and formal contractual relations between them (Nohria, 1992; Rhodes, 1998). That is, 
network governance in the form of social relations provides the glue to bind an array of 
independent yet interdependent agencies into a collective force. Ansell (2000:304) refers to 
this as a process of ‘… flexible, nonhierarchical coordination and cooperation’.  
 
In bringing together the most relevant stakeholders, networks offer a more adaptive, cohesive 
and complete response to issues - one that pools widely dispersed resources and includes the 
full array of service providers and interest groups in decision making processes not just 
preferred stakeholder groups or government departments (Waddock, 1991). In this way, 
networks allow actors from a range of sectors to form and reform into action networks to 
respond to existing and emergent issues. Kooiman (1993: 4) highlights the underpinning basis 
of such shifting formations: 
These interactions are … based on the recognition of (inter) dependencies. No 
single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required to 
solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient 
overview to make the application of needed instruments effective; no single 
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actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular 
governing model. 
 
Networks therefore acknowledge that no one person or agency has primacy of decision 
making and direction setting and that leadership can come from a number of sources within 
the network (Chisholm, 1996). Moreover, it is the unique interaction of people - including 
those located at differing levels of government and from other sectors - and their resources 
that gives networks their collaborative advantage (Huxham, 1996; Lasker, Weiss and Miller, 
2001). Thus, while providing immediate benefits of enhanced service provision, networks by 
tapping into diversity and pushing through previously contentious issues can also move in 
new and perhaps originally unintended innovative directions. As Gerlach and Palmer (1981: 
364) note, a network ‘… escalates efforts and generates forward motion through the rivalries 
and competitions among its segments and leaders.’ Thus networks can have powerful 
spillover effects, often triggering further innovation and setting off new chain reactions of 
new interventions. This 'organic' ability to adjust to others and re-organize themselves into 
adaptive patterns and structures are further strengths of networks in that they contribute to 
growth, resilience and sustainability (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000). 
 
Networks - a double-edged sword  
These positive attributes of networks - polycentric, self-organizing and mutually adjusting 
(Gerlach and Palmer, 1981; Witte et al, 2000) while enabling access to greater resources both 
material and conceptual and adding to the creative problem solving ability of networks, also 
have obverse aspects that can present problems for network management and governance. 
First, networks are comprised of diverse, independent units, with their own values and core 
objectives. This autonomy of network members presents as a threat to the stability of the 
network, as it is argued (Borys and Jemison, 1989) there is no common hierarchy to hold the 
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organizations together. Instead networks rely on each partner to direct their efforts toward a 
common purpose. When this purpose is ill defined or ambiguous, or when differing views 
cannot be accommodated, the network can become ineffective or disintegrate (Taylor and 
Hoggett, 1994; Huxham, 2000). As Borys and Jemison (1989: 237) argue 'collaboration 
among sovereign organizations means that different purposes must be reconciled and molded 
into a common purpose'. Further, because network direction is set by members, networks may 
move tangentially away from original intentions and therefore can not be assured of achieving 
their original purposes (Rhodes, 1996). In this way, network fluidity may work against 
achieving specified objectives and resist managing according to tightly defined operational 
requirements.   
 
The swiftness with which networks can act and their ability to engender creativity and 
improvisation coupled with their location, often on the periphery of traditional structures and 
processes, means that networks can be predisposed to secretive or at least 'unaccountable' or 
unauthorized actions (Machado and Burns, 1998; Rhodes, 1996). Taylor and Hoggett (1994: 
137) highlight the dangers inherent in a lack of transparency or accountability: 
Networks are essentially private or opaque rather than public and transparent. They are 
largely invisible and not open to public scrutiny, secret and unaccountable. Depending  
upon the values and norms, which govern the operation of such networks, their lack of 
public visibility has often provided the basis for corruption. 
That is, since networks take on the characteristics of self-governing entities they can 
determine their own rules and conditions of membership and frequently consider 
themselves to be accountable only to their peers and their clients. Uncontested by outside 
groups and traditional accountability measures and therefore not subject to public 
sanctions, networks can become a ‘law unto themselves’. And while much of the activities 
of networks are limited to the ‘means justifying the end’ rather than outright corruption 
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some network process can cross the boundaries to illegal or at least unethical behavior. 
Such a situation is evidenced, for example, in the allocation of contracts to members of the 
network ‘inner circle’ or their associates.    
Finally, the diversity, density, and complexity of network relationships while useful in 
ensuring multiple linkages can result in bottlenecks and information overload that present 
problems for communication. As the Blair Government noted: ‘Cross-cutting work involves 
complex relationships and lines of communication which means they can be risky, or at least 
difficult to manage’ (Performance and Innovation Unit, 2000). 
 
Network organizations thus are not a panacea for the problems of modern society or its 
governments (Taylor and Hoggett, 1994; Rhodes, 1998; Huxham, 2000,Witte et al, 2000). 
They present a host of 'inherent complications' (Powell, 1990: 305) that require careful 
design, governance and management to realize their multifarious benefits.  
 
 Network governance and management - new roles for government  
While networks appear to avoid the problems inherent in hierarchy and market models by 
bringing together a range of different stakeholders to resolve complex problems in the 
delivery of services, there are many formation, implementation and ongoing structural issues 
that need to be resolved.  An important facet of establishing and maintaining appropriate 
network arrangements to provide effective coordinated service delivery for governments is the 
issue of network governance. 
 
Network governance refers to the establishment and maintenance of relationships that bind 
organizations together and enable them to achieve collective goals. An important aspect of 
governance becomes the orchestrating of diverse instruments into harmony, while still 
respecting autonomy and fostering innovation and creativity. Kickert (1997: 735) describes 
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this process as 'directed influencing'. Such a task is achieved by replacing the ‘iron hand of 
the hierarchy’ with the ‘velvet glove of diplomacy’. In this way, governance is less about 
'rowing' and more about 'steering' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993) and, when appropriate, 
sharing the helm. For government this represents a shift from being at the center of power and 
locates them as equal players (albeit with special functions) within the coordination function. 
However, despite this ‘equal player status’ as Klinj and Koopenjan (2001) point out, the 
special functions of governments and their access to resources not readily available to other 
network members puts them in the powerful position of being able to direct network actions, 
favour some networks over others through funding regimes or ‘unhook’ networks from 
funding sources. This is particularly true for central agencies since they are located at the hub 
of decision-making and resource allocation (O’Grady, 1985). 
 
Nevertheless, since government networks are conducted within a largely legal/political 
environment (Agranoff and Lindsay, 1983; Agranoff, 1990; Klijn and Koopenjan, 2000) with 
strong needs for transparency, accountability and effectiveness; they still require some degree 
of control over network structures, activities and, especially, outcomes. Therefore, 
increasingly governments are developing strategies that move beyond a reliance on the broad 
governance processes of network constitution and composition to include an influence over 
structural arrangements, direction setting, processes and outcomes (Klijn, Koopenjan and 
Termeer, 1995; Klinj and Koopenjan, 2000); Mitchell and Shortell, 2000).   
 
Thus an important, emerging role of government and of central agencies in a networked 
model becomes that of managing the external relational and internal implementation aspects 
of network operation (Mitchell and Shortell, 2000). The fulfillment of this network 
management role will require government to expand their current 'tool kit' at both the macro 
and micro management levels. At the macro level the focus is on ‘preparing the ground’ for 
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network activity including getting the correct mindset or values in place within and across 
government, providing legitimacy for network action, and ensuring systems and procedures 
are able to respond(Performance and Innovation Unit, 2000).   
 
By attending to these macro level tasks, government and particularly central agencies will be 
able to better facilitate shared visions, clarify mutual expectations, and establish appropriate 
communication mechanisms. Adopting this ‘leadership’ role and through the championing of 
initiatives, government will be better able to model (and monitor) appropriate accountability, 
ethical and organizational practices.. In this way as Cohen and Rogers (1992) suggest a 
possible role for the state is to 'orchestrate the diversity of particularlism into an equitable 
system of provision, referee its conflicts, tap its commitment and render the secret 
accountable'.   
 
Micro level skills are more enigmatic requiring the ability to participate as an equal network 
member while still guiding and facilitating direction and outcomes (Rhodes 1996). This dual 
network ‘maintenance’ function comes from the need to build and invest in relationships to 
foster cohesion and mutuality while at the same time looking to consolidate and action the 
network agenda (Klinj and Koopenjan, 2000). The emphasis, at this level for government, lies 
in negotiated management that is achieving mutually satisfying goals through a process of 
dialogue, arbitration and exchange not in the imposition of solutions or objectives onto other 
network members (Rhodes, 1998; Davis and Rhodes, 2000). Achieving the necessary balance 
between guidance and control in network management would seem to be a skillful enterprise 
and requires government agencies, particularly those central agencies that are generally 
responsible for the implementation of whole-of-government networked structures, to carefully 
consider the mix of roles necessary for the management of networks. It also requires a 
significant shift in their power base to enable other players (outside of their domain and even 
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government) to lead the way. Understandably for central agencies, for so long had been at the 
fulcrum of direction setting within the state, this new role will not sit easy. Following Rhodes 
(1998) this paper suggests that this unease is centered on the relative autonomy of networks 
and the fact that they resist steering.  
 
This section showed how service fragmentation coupled with increasingly stringent 
government budgets, increasing complexity of social problems and changing community 
expectations and values, and a heightened need to deal with intractable or wicked issues, led 
to the use of networks as a preferred model of coordination. However, while useful, networks 
are not a panacea for solving all the ‘problems’ of government and if not managed 
appropriately or become subject to other factors, can limit or constrain outcomes or perceived 
benefits. Further, as the following case study suggests, central agencies remain apprehensive 
about these networks and their distant 'hold' over them. Thus when networks are perceived to 
'get out of control' or other forces come into play that render them problematic they are likely 
to be dismantled and replaced with more secure coordination models (Lowndes and Skelcher 
1998; Klinj and Koopenjan, 2000).  
METHODOLOGY 
The research design follows a case study format designed to establish those factors that 
impacted on a particular government network.  In this way, the barriers and enabling factors 
for effective network implementation and governance may be identified. Using a case study 
methodology allowed the ability to ascertain causal linkages between the different elements of 
the case (Yin, 1980).  A case study of an existing network provided an opportunity to 
determine the critical aspects of network operation and structure. The case study is based on 
data from preliminary unstructured interviews of key participants in the project, survey and 
focus group data and related documentation, and provides an example of a cross-government 
reform effort in the Queensland public sector.  
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Interviews were undertaken with ten key participants of the GSD project over a three-month 
period during the later half of 2000.  For these key respondents each interview lasted one hour 
and followed a similar unstructured process in which respondents were asked to reflect 
generally on their understanding of the GSD project, their involvement in the project and 
critical aspects of the project’s governance structure and management. Additional information 
was obtained from survey data completed by members of Regional Managers Forums as well 
as a series of three focus groups of public sector managers and policy advisors conducted 
throughout the state during the same timeframe. Through a series of individual and group 
report back sessions, participants were given the opportunity to correct, amend and confirm 
information and insights gleaned from interviews. Such a process enabled a range of 
perspectives across government to be captured and, when coupled with multiple data 
gathering mechanisms and especially the report back process, afforded enhanced verification 
and validity of the insights gleaned (Patton, 1987). 
FINDINGS 
Government Service Delivery Project - A network governance coordination model 
Similar to other jurisdictions, ongoing public service reforms in Queensland were argued to 
have resulted in a public service that was professional, accountable and relatively efficient 
(Roach, 1999; Government Service Delivery Project, 2000a). By the end of the 1990s 
however, it was apparent that traditional reform models with their emphasis on structural 
changes and internal quality mechanisms had reached their capacity for achieving 
improvement and that further efficiencies in government required strategic integration at 
whole-of-government, agency and regional levels. Indeed, a consistent theme emerging from 
government consultations and reports at the time centered on the problems of fragmentation 
and duplication of services and the need for government to become better coordinated - 
particularly in terms of providing services at the community level (Pearson, 1999). This point 
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was most graphically made by a delegation to the Bundamba Community Cabinet (an 
initiative of the Beattie Labor Government to better engage with the community) that 
identified problems relating to: ‘Multiple agencies, both government and non-government, 
that are poorly coordinated, disparate and not in synchronization’. The traditional top-down 
implementation ethos of government that relies on ‘head office program direction-setting to 
the detriment of a place focus’ was also identified as problematic (cited in GSD, 2000a). 
    
In acknowledgment of these concerns the government had established a policy agenda with a 
cross agency focus and was exploring a number of alternative modes for delivery of more 
'joined-up' or seamless service delivery at all levels of government (Head, 1999; GSD, 2000c) 
Some of these initiatives included 'shop front' services, electronic service delivery, 
community renewal as well as establishing a set of broad government priorities that 
emphasized cooperative action between departments (Head, 1999). Alongside of this 
cooperative aspects were built into Chief Executive Officer’s performance agreements 
(Department of Premier and Cabinet, internal document - Chief Executive Officer 
Performance Agreement, 2000/2001). 
 
It was in such a climate, that the Government Service Delivery Project (GSD) was established 
in 1998. Sponsored by the Office of Public Service Commissioner (OPSC) a former central 
agency that was reconstituted in 2000 as the Office of Public Service, Equity and Merit, and 
endorsed by the Chief Executive Officers' Forum the project was an attempt at a 'new way' of 
doing business within government (GSD, 1999:1). For many it was seen a bold and timely 
departure from traditional service provision mechanisms. Indeed, much of its concept and 
form were based on learnings derived from participation in the Experiential Leadership 
Development Program (ELDP) a leadership-training program conducted within the OPSC for 
senior public sector managers. As its promotional leaflet claims: 
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ELDP builds an individual's capacity to effectively lead others in a changing 
environment. Throughout the program people apply their new knowledge and 
skills to create a shared vision, build effective organisational cultures and strong 
cross-agency networks.  
On the influence of ELDP one respondent noted that: ‘The EDLP process provided an 
important motivational force. That is, there was a critical mass of people (public servants) 
supporting the concept from within the public sector’.  
 
More specifically the values and behaviors espoused by these graduates were consistent with 
the goals of the GSD Project.  Thus, the emphasis of ELDP on team-based learning and 
relationship building provided a new way of thinking and a forum for discussions on attaining 
a 'new' public service. Another interviewee commented that the program highlighted ‘the 
value of working together’ and provided an impetus to change the way that public services are 
provided. 
 
ELDP therefore contributed to the mood for a more cooperative and collaborative model of 
reform - one that sat well with the network governance model. The strong emphasis on 
relationships as the glue to bond departments together is shown below:  
 
Believed it was the way of the future. There were enough examples of success in 
bringing players together. By doing so it would overcome the natural logic of politics 
(silo approach). Focus was to be on sharing credit and the burden of failure. 
 
Thus the shared principles and values of many graduates of the ELDP Program coupled with 
the need to bring a range of stakeholders located at differing levels within the public service 
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system proved to be the catalyst to a reform model that essentially sought to join-up the public 
service and, in doing so, to enhance the service provision to the community.  
 
Building and linking networks through relationships 
The GSD Project acknowledged that there were a number of initiatives already occurring 
within the Queensland government aimed at 'joined up' services. It therefore looked to 
augment and build on the existing networks established around these initiatives by creating an 
overlay of horizontal and vertical networks to increase government's ability to implement its 
priorities through more integrated service delivery (GSD, 2000d). As one respondent noted: 
It was considered that the network model, by focusing on the public service as a 
'whole' rather than as a collection of independent parts or 'silos', would lead to 
greater 'synergies' between departments and as a consequence better 
outcomes for the public.  
 
Thus the GSD Project, with its core set of values and an array of interlinking networks, 
formed a 'governance' network that overlaid existing and emergent policy and service 
networks. In this way the array of government services could begin to be 'joined -up' into a 
more cohesive, coordinated and comprehensive system of service delivery.  
 
In a departure from previous reform strategies, the GSD project centered much of its early 
focus on engaging with the public service sector in order to inform and validate the direction 
of the project and to secure wide ranging support. In its broadest terms, engagement is a 
process of ‘working collaboratively with and through groups of people affiliated by common 
interests' to achieve mutually satisfying outcomes (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 1997). It is generally believed that engagement leads to not only clearer and more 
relevant intervention directions but also a stronger commitment. For the GSD Team, this 
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'engagement process' consisted of a series of workshops, meeting and discussions in Brisbane 
and regional centers and involved senior executive officers, middle managers and policy 
development staff and regional managers. The strategies and initiatives that were 
subsequently developed by GSD therefore grew out of this broad engagement process, rather 
than being inventions developed and imposed by the team. As a consequence of the 
engagement approach to implementing the GSD project, there was claimed to be broad 
ownership and support for the GSD and its initiatives across the public service (GSD, 2000b, 
2000c).  The following comment encapsulates the view of a number of respondents, 
indicating that the project's outcomes were the:  
Result of extensive consultation with Regional Managers' Forums, Regional 
Workshops, and Policy Officer Workshops.  Feedback from these was used in 
developing the final Innovation and Service Improvement Framework.  This was more 
than consultation - it was true engagement. Ideas were sought and included in the 
Framework. This process involved around 2,500 people.  
 
Pivotal to the success of the GSD Project then was the establishment of a community of key 
people as well as a series of cluster groups or 'horizontal networks' across specific areas of 
interest to begin to link up services. These, essentially structural and relational aspects of the 
Project, were augmented by activities such as the development of a framework to guide 
coordinative and collaborative effort across government and the establishment of a series of 
case studies on networked action to provide ongoing insight into the benefits and blockages 
for this type of initiative. In this way the intent was to provide some beginning linking 
mechanisms across sectors, information to guide the project as well as build a base of support 
to champion the project.  
 
Early successes forecast demise 
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At a time of growing dissatisfaction by public servants with the current mechanisms for 
delivering public services, the GSD offered public servants some hope for change by 
providing mechanisms that fostered inclusiveness, innovation in service delivery, and 
unification of the public service.  
 
From early on the GSD Project was met with enthusiasm and commitment. It was widely 
perceived as a 'real opportunity' for the public service to make a contribution to the improved 
well-being of Queenslanders through greater integration of services at both policy and service 
levels. By actively seeking out and engaging with the public service and demonstrating the 
advantages and potential of integrated government the GSD Project provided a vehicle for 
new ideas and services to be discussed and trailed.  As one respondent commented:‘ People 
were all going in the one direction - working as one public service’. 
 
The GSD process, by tapping into and linking various networks was able to identify common 
themes and values, which helped to unite a previously distinct ethos. A respondent viewed the 
success of the GSD Project, as ‘one of the few times that there has been a strong alignment 
between regional and head office issues’.   
 
There was also strong support for the development of systems and processes that broke down 
barriers between departments and facilitated joined-up government. The adoption of a 
'network' model was also perceived as ‘a more inclusive process' that allowed for levels of the 
public sector to be part of the solution. The project's communication and marketing strengths 
were also acknowledged with the GSD project being awarded Australian Marketing Institute 
Award (State) Leadership in Marketing Excellence Marketing Award for 2000. 
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Thus the GSD Project was successful at building a common vision for a different way of 
providing government services. It used this joint vision and associated relationships to 
provide a link between existing and emergent networks and, in doing so, began to shift the 
coordination focus outward. 
 
Despite these early successes, however, the GSD Project was effectively dismantled in mid 
2000 after less than two years operation, with aspects of its operation later amalgamated into 
the Access Queensland Program, an offshoot of the GSD Project that sought to use 
technology to deliver seamless transaction, information and referral services to the public. 
Ironically, although not surprisingly as the literature indicates (Taylor and Hoggett, 1994; 
Limerick, Cunnington and Crowther, 1998; Witte et al, 2000), it was the successful aspects of 
the GSD, particularly those pushed the boundaries of traditional coordination modes, that 
made it vulnerable to changing forces within government and contributed toward its later 
difficulty in achieving ongoing sustainability.  
 
The findings of the case study determine that a number of factors were pivotal to the 
vulnerability and ultimate dismantling of the GSD project. These factors include a lack of 
formal authorization for the project, the loss of a high-level project champion, a perceived 
overemphasis on process rather than outcomes, a perceived lack of outcomes, and the 
proposed elevation of the role of regional managers.  
 
Balancing network practice with political and operational realities 
Although the GSD Project and its ideals had been endorsed by the Queensland Government it 
nevertheless failed to receive direct funding. Initially this was not perceived by the GSD 
Implementation Team as a major issue. Indeed, it was used as a strategy to build 'ownership' 
or 'buy-in' from Chief Executive Officers by requesting that each department contribute funds 
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to an operating account. In a show of support for the project most CEOs made financial or 'in-
kind' contributions.  
 
However, the failure of the GSD project to secure funding from Treasury, perhaps the most 
powerful central agency of state, was seen by a number of external respondents as a strong 
indicator that the project did not have the 'high level' support necessary to prevail. Indeed, the 
allocation of significant funds to the related Access Queensland project was seen as 
confirmation of a change in direction by government. This view was encapsulated by the 
following: ‘Most people thought that when GSD did not receive funds from budget that it did 
not have the support of government. Despite all the rhetoric, real, genuine support equals 
funds. Access Queensland received $4.5M, GSD - none. Clearly that was the way that 
government wanted to go’. 
 
In retrospect, a number of GSD Project Implementation Team members agreed that this 
was a significant point for the ongoing operation of the project as it highlighted the lack 
of formal sponsorship or authorization for the project: This view was succinctly put as 
follows: The project lacked higher-level political sponsorship. There was plenty of good 
will - but no safety net. It was not a political priority and that was reflected in the lack 
of funding.  
 
Consequently the GSD Project had to rely on the ongoing support of the broader public sector 
to meet its aims. This support was to be achieved through two distinct implementation 
strategies. The first centered on the use of the Commissioner of the Public Service as a high 
level 'champion' of the project to peers at higher levels of government such as the Steering 
Committee members and the Chief Executive Officers.  This person reflected on the role:  
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As Chair of the Steering Committee I demonstrated senior championing of what was 
being done.  (I) Worked with smaller groups of CEOs and gave examples of concepts 
and projects that were consistent with GSD.  Publicized real working examples of 
success rather than just ideas and possibilities – and emphasized the benefits of 
addressing issues this way.  
 
As Noble (1999: 26) notes the presence of a powerful champion helps to generate resources 
and support and provides 'overall direction' to project initiatives. Clearly this was a successful 
strategy, as it was widely agreed that the 'table of equals' was well informed and committed to 
the project and that the 'champion’s influence emanated throughout the public service 
fostering both hope and the mobilization of resources toward ‘pockets of collaboration'. 
However, with the transfer of the key champion the benefits of this role ceased and made the 
project vulnerable to changes within the machinery of government. This was exacerbated by 
the lack of formal authorization allocated to the project. There was also a strong opinion held 
by some respondents that the GSD Project lacked a higher level sponsor - one that linked it 
more directly to the power base or authorizing processes of government. With this higher 
level of support and more formal authorization it may have been more difficult to 'pull the 
project'. More specifically it was stated that:  
The project was bureaucratically driven. Therefore there was no flack when it was 
disbanded.    
The loss of the high-level project champion was a critical blow since it disrupted the 
operation of the network, limited access to higher levels and effectively unhooked the project 
from the authority chain. With neither a champion nor sponsor, the project lost its 
'authorization' and became vulnerable to changing forces within the machinery of 
government. In short, the project, while retaining strong links horizontally across the public 
sector, became unhooked from the vertical axis of influence and authority. Without this 
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linkage element the full effects of ‘network capital’ could not be attained (Hampshire and 
Healy, 2000).  
 
Another factor creating difficulties for the continued operation of the GSD network was the 
excessive emphasis on process at the expense of ‘bigger picture’ issues and objectives. On 
reflection some GSD Team members identified the overemphasis on process and an absence 
of tangible outcomes as contributing to a loss of support for the project. This view was 
highlighted in the following comment: 
 
The project was looking to the long term. We were not expecting to see hard, 
tangible outcomes in the short term. In retrospect I don't believe the sector can 
or will wear this. They need to see something in twelve months and something 
significant in two years. 
 
These problems were compounded by a countervailing emphasis on other 'lower' sections of 
the public service and the strong emphasis that emerged as part of the Communication and 
Marketing Strategy. This Communication and Marketing Strategy was employed to ensure 
that other levels within the public service remained informed of the project and committed to 
its activities. As noted earlier this 'engagement process' was highly successful, securing 
support for the project and providing input into initiatives such as the Innovation and Service 
Improvement Framework. In pursuing this marketing and communication strategy, through 
the 'engagement process' the Regional Managers' Forums (RMF) were identified as a model 
for broader whole-of-government coordination (GSD, 1999). The RMF became the focus of 
much of the Project Team's efforts and this diverted attention away from staying in touch with 
other levels within the public service. Moreover, the subsequent submissions to increase the 
leverage of RMFs by way of an independent funding source and increased access to decision 
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making processes was also identified as contributing toward a loss of support. These 
proposals moved the role of the RMF beyond their authorized and established functions of 
information and exchange, resource sharing and peak regional consultative role (Resource 
Document for Regional Managers' Forums 1994). As one respondent commented ‘these 
proposals were perceived as a threat because the ‘centre’ did not value decentralization’.  
Such a view is consistent with Peters and Savoie (1996 :283) who state: ‘In a world of 
government that is more concerned with the empowerment of the lower echelons of the public 
service and of their clients, central agencies appear to be anachronisms’. Thus the GSD, with 
its attempt to involve horizontal decentralized players in policy development challenged the 
vertical axis of government and this resulted in structural tension. Matheson (2000) suggests 
there is a structural tension between the two axes of government - the vertical that operates on 
central control and the horizontal that tends to emphasize the involvement of decentralized 
players in policy development and service delivery. As Hoggett (1991, cited in Lawrence, 
1999:4) expands, decentralization ‘sounds fine in theory but in practice it would crucially 
weaken the ability of the center to direct and influence policy’.  
 
Perhaps most importantly those involved in the GSD project failed to replace the high level 
champion when the original high level champion was removed.  In staying focused on the 
'ground' or the 'troops', an important top-down driving force in the support of a high level 
champion may have been ignored. Without the ongoing focus of the ‘champion’ to provide 
the impetus for continued support and legitimacy as well as the mobilization of resources at 
lower levels of operation, a level of doubt and cynicism began to emerge at the field. 
Additionally, without a project champion active in key decision-making venues, the project 
vertical linkage and authority was severely limited.  
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In this way, the continued survival and maintenance of the GSD project came under threat 
from the lack of resource control, becoming unhooked from the hierarchical control of the 
high level champion and the technical coherence of processes being undermined by the overly 
processual nature of transactions within the network. Finally, a perceived lack of tangible 
outcomes also contributed to the failure of the project.  
 
While perhaps the GSD Project could have withstood any of these factors singly it was their 
combination, coupled with a strong centripetal ' pull to the center' due to a forthcoming 
election and the need for government to present as a coherent force that contributed to its loss 
of status as a reform initiative and subsequent dismantling. It was commented: 
The machinery of government was looking to bring things into the center while 
at the same time GSD was apparently going in the opposite direction. 
Thus confronted by an impending election and the need for coherency and control, and 
inexperienced and unsure of the network role and management principles, government 
reverted to ‘old routines’ (Klinj and Koopenjan, 2000: 154). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Networks have become a pervasive feature of public administration in Queensland. They are a 
useful adjunct to the traditional forms of social coordination because they extend beyond the 
limited hierarchical and contractual relations of other coordination models to link up all 
relevant actors. In so doing they are able to access a wider array of resources, bring together 
independent entities, engender more creative and coherent solutions, and move in new and 
innovative directions. However, by pushing out or extending the decision making ability to 
‘external players’ networks both challenge the ‘status quo’ and necessitate the adoption of 
new, and perhaps, uncomfortable roles for central agencies.  Moreover, when network 
activities tip balance of power from the vertical axis to the horizontal, relational axis, there is 
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often a return to a more ‘centralized’ coordination models that are more easily controlled 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). 
 
 
This was almost certainly the situation for the Government Service Delivery Project. The 
project secured the interest and commitment of public servants looking to move the public 
sector in a new direction. In doing so the GSD made inroads toward developing an overall 
framework to guide and sustain 'joined-up' government initiatives. By establishing 
relationships with existing and emerging networks within and external to the public sector it 
began to link previously dispersed and disparate operations into a coherent 'whole'. However, 
when the GSD looked to adjust or share some of the decision-making processes from the 
centre to the network members, the project itself became ‘adrift’ from its support base and 
was subsequently dismantled.     
 
While ultimately, the GSD project was a case study of the dismantling of a cross-sectoral and 
agency network there are valuable lessons to be learnt in relation to the operation of cross 
government service delivery networks, coordination of activities through networked 
arrangements and governance issues in networks. Specifically these lessons centre on 
managing the vertical – linking - aspects of network building as well as the horizontal – 
bonding and bridging elements, and giving equal emphasis to tasks and outcomes as well as 
relational processes.   
 
In conclusion, the case study demonstrates that while networks represent a useful mechanism 
to coordinate services through collective action within and across government, their inherent 
push to the periphery will be inevitability be met by an equal if not greater push to the centre.  
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